70 years of the Marshall plan. Facts and myths about the largest development program of the 20th century
 
This plan has become a model of effective and effective economic assistance. His influence on the reconstruction of Europe, however, can be exaggerated.

Gen. George Marschall, one of the initiators of the US assistance program for Europe.
Universal Images Group / Corbis

Raise debris and build modern, developed economies. What Western Europe did after World War II often stimulates the imagination of those who dream of rapid development. References to the American program more than half a century ago appear constantly in public debate, also in Poland. Donald Tusk in the summer, and Ewa Kopacz in the autumn argued in the Sejm that EU funds for Poland are greater than the funds of the Marshall plan. At the beginning of January, the British "The Guardian" issued an appeal by European intellectuals for a "Marshall plan for Ukraine." Rockman Bob Geldof and Bono, in turn, urged the Marshall Plan for Africa when they organized a series of Live 8 concerts in 2005.

For proponents of introducing similar programs for poor countries today, the Marshall Plan is the main historical argument for the effectiveness of external financial assistance. However, what do we know today about its impact on the reconstruction of Europe? This issue has become the subject of interesting debate among historians.

The beginning of 30 years of glory:
On one of the posters promoting the Marshall plan there is a ship symbolizing European countries, in whose sails the American aid wind blows. The message was clear: financial support from the New World drives the integration and economic development of the Old Continent. This goal was reflected in the official name: European Recovery Program. It was commonly described by the name of George Marshall, then Secretary of State of the United States, one of the initiators of the project.

In four years, from 1948 to 1951, the US allocated over $ 13 billion to 16 European countries. Under these funds, the United States shipped raw materials (including coal), food, machinery and other products. European governments sold donated goods on internal markets, and the money collected in this way was allocated for investments, loans to enterprises, covering budget deficits, repayment of debt or subsequent orders.

In the opinion of American diplomacy, Europe was in a deep economic and political crisis that could make it the spoil of communists. The Marshall Plan was therefore part of the tactic announced by Truman to stop communism. Under the pressure of the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, including Poland, refused to participate in the program.

American assistance coincided with the beginning of an era of unprecedented development in Western Europe. For almost 30 years, until the early 1970s, economic growth reached an average of 5 percent. annually. This was not the case earlier or later in this area. The Old Continent not only quickly rebuilt after two world wars, but also dynamically developed. The per capita income in the early 1970s was almost two and a half times higher than before the war. Europeans have achieved virtually the same standard of living as Americans. The wages of workers, who also benefited from the welfare of the welfare provided by the state, increased, and more and more consumer goods appeared in stores, which more and more buyers could afford. In France, it is customary to refer to this time as 30 years of glory (les trente glorieuses), in Sweden - record years (rekordaren).

In 1970, British historian Richard Mayne was not alone when he wrote: "From a 20-year perspective, it can be said with certainty that the Marshall Plan was a major leap forward for Europe. Investment aid, fertilizers, machinery and tools, production programs and growth planning laid the foundation for later development. Thanks to the supply of food and raw materials, the Marshall plan saved Europeans from an imminent economic disaster. "

In this sense, help from across the Atlantic saved European democracy, averted the communist threat, and led European economies to a path of growth. It became a catalyst for the European economic miracle.

Europe could do it alone?
In the 1980s, however, more voices began to appear suggesting that the importance of the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe was exaggerated. British historian Alan Milward, who published the book "The Reconstruction of Western Europe" in 1984, pointed out that Western Europe entered the path of growth right after the war before the Marshall plan was implemented. By the end of 1947, Great Britain and France had reached pre-war production levels by in the middle of the following year, the average level of industrial production in Western Europe exceeded the level before the war. The Marshall Plan was adopted by the American Congress in April 1948, and aid did not start flowing to Europe until the summer of 1948.

Milward claimed that by assigning the lead role to the Marshall plan, Europe's potential was underestimated. Already in 1945–47 European governments made a huge effort, creating the foundations of a welfare state and preparing reconstruction programs. The prosperity was influenced by the public investment plan of the French Commissioner for Planning Jean Monnet and the reform of West German Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard. The economic problems of Europe in 1947 were rather a temporary shortage of dollars, caused by large imports from the United States. They resulted not from a deep economic collapse, but from the economic boom in 1945–47.

According to Milward, help under the Marshall plan was significant and could slightly increase the rate of economic growth. However, it was too small to significantly affect the condition of European economies and bring about the growth effect that Europe experienced in the next two decades. The value of products reaching Europe under US assistance accounted for an average of 1 to 4 percent. Host countries' GDP. For comparison - the inflow of European funds to Poland is about 2 percent. GDP per year (after deducting Polish contributions to the EU budget). The Marshall plan is different if you look at its total value. For example, France received almost $ 2.5 billion under the four-year Marshall Plan, which accounted for 11 percent. its 1948 GDP

EUR 105 billion, which will come to Poland from EU funds for the years 2014–20 (under the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy), constitutes about 25 percent. current Polish GDP. And the total sum of all money received from the Union in the years 2007–20 will be about 60 percent. Polish GDP from 2007. These sums actually exceed several times the support received by Europe under the Marshall plan.

So, did the Americans look at post-war Europe in too dark glasses, and their help was unnecessary?


Help alleviates conflicts:
Milward's revelations, although they brought a fresh perspective on the role of the Marshall plan and stripped his myth, were considered too harmful for the American aid program. Historians tended towards an indirect assessment: without apotheosis, but also without diminishing the role of this, as it were, a serious injection to the economy.

Barry Eichengreen, a well-known economic historian at Berkeley University, confirmed Milward's findings - in total, American aid has raised European GDP by around 2 percent. at a time when it increased by more than 20 percent. This does not mean that the Marshall plan played a negligible role. As Eichengreen pointed out, the improvement of social moods and living conditions of the population did not follow the post-war economic recovery and the progress of reconstruction. To a large extent, this was due to high expenditure on reconstruction and investment, which forced governments to reduce consumption expenditure. Workers' strikes, especially organized by communist trade unions, troubled Europe. In the spring and summer of 1947, a wave of strikes went through France. A year later, in Western Germany, trade unions announced a strike under the slogan "against the economic policy of exploiting the people." According to Eichengreen, there was a risk of repetition in Europe of the events of the interwar period, when some European governments - yielding to pressure - increased wages and pursued protectionist customs policy (they imposed high duties on imported products to protect domestic industry and jobs). In this way, rising inflation and high tariffs were destroying the European economy.

The Marshall Plan helped alleviate social conflicts. This facilitated the accumulation of funds for investments. According to Eichengreen, the conditions under which this aid was granted also determined the importance of the Marshall Plan. They forced European countries to cooperate (the European Organization for Economic Cooperation was founded then) and to give up protectionism. That is why the American historian called the Marshall Plan the most successful program of structural adjustment in history, that is, help that is also followed by specific directives on reforms and legal solutions.

Also the British historian Tony Judt, author of the popular monograph on the history of Europe "Postwar", distanced himself from the views of Milward. In his opinion, the Marshall plan was primarily psychological and political. By addressing food shortages, supporting economic growth in the short term, and reducing the burden of post-war chaos and destruction, he helped Europeans believe in the future. The improvement in moods clearly translated into the political situation. "The Marshall Plan has allowed Europeans to gain greater confidence. He ultimately helped them break with the legacy of chauvinism, depression and authoritarian solutions. (...) He made protectionist policy of the 1930s backward, unnecessary and ultimately absurd. "

Regardless of the discrepancy in assessments regarding the impact of American aid, all researchers agree that it did not hit the vacuum. The Marshall Plan has helped Europe tap into its potential. His story proves that external help can be a significant support for economic success, but not necessarily its direct cause.